ELM, Inc. Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. M.T. Enterprises, Inc. aka M.T. Mechanical, a Utah corporation; and Morris Told : Appellants\u27 Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
ELM, Inc. Plaintiff/Appellee, vs. M.T. Enterprises,
Inc. aka M.T. Mechanical, a Utah corporation; and
Morris Told : Appellants' Petition for Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian W. Steffensen; Steffensen McDonald Steffensen; Attorney for Appellants.
John P. Harrington; Ray, Quinney & Nebeker; Attorney for Appellee.
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court
of Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, ELM v. M.T. Enterprises, No. 971578 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1283




K F U 
50 
O C K E T N O . - i l L S i f i ^ l 




M.T. Enterprises, Inc. aka 
M.T. Mechanical, a Utah corporation; 
and Morris Told CaseNo.971578-CA 
Defendants/Appellants/Petitioners. 
APPELLANTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal From the Orders of the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, State of Utah 
Honorable Howard Maetani 
John P. Harrington 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone (801) 532-1500 
Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. 
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 485-3707 
FILED 
cw*oftheOourt 
Brian W. Steffensen, P.C. (#3092) 
Steffensen • McDonald • Steffensen 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 485-3707 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ELM, Inc. Appellants' Petition for Rehearing 
v. 
M.T. Enterprises, Inc. aka 
M.T. Mechanical, a Utah 
corporation; and Morris Told, Case No. 971578-CA 
Appellants' M.T. Enterprises, Inc. ("MT") and Morris Told ("Told"), by and 
through their undersigned counsel, hereby petition the court for rehearing herein 
pursuant to Rule 35. Appellants/Petitioners respectfully submit that the Court 
misconstrued the Federal law governing the certification of payrolls, and that if properly 
construed, the Appellants' appeal with respect to the trial court's granting of summary 
judgment would need to be granted. 
Summary of Argument 
The Court of Appeals ruled that Federal Law did not require ELM to submit 
certified payrolls, but rather that said law would have allowed Appellants — as the lessees 
of employees from ELM — to certify said payrolls. This conclusion is incorrect for the 
simple reason that the Federal Davis-Bacon Act requires the actual employer of persons 
performing work on a Federal project to pay said persons Davis-Bacon compliant wages; 
and the regulations require the actual employer of such laborers on a Federal project to 
certify the amounts which it has paid to its employees. The Court of Appeals incorrectly 
concluded that MT could certify the payrolls of ELM. This inaccurate conclusion of law 
requires reconsideration of the Court's announced decision. 
Statement of Facts 
1. Comtrol, Inc. was the direct contractor with the United States for work to 
be performed at one or more Federal projects in Utah. 
2. Comtrol contracted with MT to perform certain HVAC portions of this 
work. 
3. ELM contracted with MT to employ and lease to MT the actual laborers in 
connection with these Federal projects - such that ELM, not MT, was the actual, literal 
employer of said laborers. 
4. MT has alleged that ELM represented prior to execution of the contract 
that it understood that as the actual employer of the laborers, ELM would be required by 
Federal law to pay said laborers Davis-Bacon wages and to provide certified payrolls; and 
that ELM specifically represented and promised that it would do so. 
5. The trial court and the Court of Appeals have concluded that the language 
of the written contract signed by MT and ELM did not specifically require ELM to 
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provide certified * 
nevertheless independently impose a duty upon ELM to provide said payrolls. 
6. The record contains testimony that ELM attempted to provide certified 
payrolls; that Comtrol refused to pay MT because MT had not obtained from ELM 
payrolls certified by ELM; that Comtrol would not allow MT to certify the payrolls for 
3 *nployees; .mil lliuil I11 I III! (IifihrjlKn i signed in blank the required certification 
sheets and gave them to MT so that MT could submit them with other payroll data to 
Comtrol so that MT could be paid on its contract with Comtrol. 
1. The trial court asked counsel ill Hi< •imiiirin iiid^mnit linn iiiii),,! w li.it 
Federal law applied to this situation. MT's counsel indicated that the applicable law was 
tin 111 is liimiii Act, and that it required the actual employer of the laborers to certify 
the amounts that they had paid to the laborers. ELM's counsel represented to the trial 
court that the law allows either the actual employer or an upper-tier contractor to certify 
the payrolls. Without reseat epresentations 
as to the requirements of the Davis-Bacon Act and its accompanying regulations. 
8* ]\ 11 rovided the Court of Appeals with copies of pertinent portions of the 
Davis-Bacon Act and its regulations after the oral argument, and offered to brief the 
issue; but the offer to brief this specific issue was not accepted. 
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Argument 
The Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. 276a to 276a-7 (1988), and its implementing 
regulations found in 29 C.F.R. Section 3, require payment of "Davis-Bacon wages" to all 
employees performing labor on a Federal project. Of critical importance is the language 
of 29 C.F.R. 3.3(b) (1997), which provides the following: 
(b) Each contractor or subcontractor ... shall furnish each week a statement with 
respect to the wages paid each of its employees engaged on work covered by this ... 
chapter during the preceding weekly payroll period. This statement shall be executed by 
the contractor or subcontractor or by an authorized officer or employee of the contractor 
or subcontractor who supervises the payment of wages .... Ibid. (Emphasis added) 
This section clearly requires a statement from the actual employer of the laborers. For 
example, Comtrol was the general contractor. Its contract with the United States almost 
certainly required it to make sure that all of the laborers working on the pertinent 
projects were paid in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act. But, it could not "furnish 
each week a statement with respect to the wages paid" to each of the laborers performing 
work pursuant to MT's portion of the project, because none of those laborers were "its 
employees engaged on work covered by this ... chapter ...." 29 C.F.R. 3.3(b)(1997) 
Neither Comtrol nor MT could provide the required "statement with respect to 
wages" for ELM because the laborers were "[ELM's] employees engaged on work" at the 
Federal job site — and only ELM's employees. 
Furthermore, only an officer or supervisory employee of ELM could sign those 
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statements. The latter part of 29 C.F.R. 3.3(b) quoted above makes it clear that the 
statements regarding the amounts paid to ELM's employees could only be signed by "an 
authorized officer" of ELM, "or [the] employee of [ELM1 who supervise[d] the payment 
of wages" by ELM to them. It was for this reason that Comtrol would not allow MT to 
execute certified payrolls for ELM's employees. Comtrol would only accept payroll 
statements which had been executed by an officer of ELM, or by the employee of ELM 
who "supervise[d] the payment" by ELM "of wages" to the ELM employees which MT 
leased. 
MT did not pay the laborers — ELM did. No one at MT was an officer of ELM. 
No one at MT was the employee at ELM who supervised ELM's payment of wages to 
ELM's employees. Consequently, no one at MT could provide or execute the 
"statements" as to wages paid required by the Davis-Bacon Act and the above-cited 
regulations. Only an officer of ELM, or the payroll supervisor at ELM, could execute the 
statutorily required "statements" — which is exactly what Comtrol required. 
The Appellants/Petitioners respectfully submit that the Court of Appeals 
misconstrued these regulations when it concluded in its opinion that "the reports ... may 
be executed either by M.T. or M.T. may authorize ELM to do so." Opinion at page 7 
This conclusion of law was incorrect and resulted in the Court of Appeals affirming the 
trial court. This conclusion of law must be reconsidered and corrected, and the trial 
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court's granting of summary judgment reversed. 
Conclusion 
Rule 35 allows a party to petition for rehearing if it believes that the Court of 
Appeals has misapprehended a critical point of law. The Appellants are absolutely 
certain that the Court of Appeals has incorrectly construed the above cited statutory and 
regulatory law as shown above. The correct conclusion of law is that ELM had a duty 
under Federal Law, as the actual and direct employer of the laborers in question, to 
prepare and certify as accurate the statements as to wages required by 29 C.F.R. 3.3(b). 
The trial court was in error, therefore, when it granted summary judgment in favor of 
ELM on the grounds that neither the literal language of the written contract nor the 
requirements of Federal Law applicable to ELM required ELM to prepare and submit 
certified payrolls. The trial court was therefore in error when it ruled, based upon this 
incorrect conclusion of law, that MT could not prevail on its counterclaim and/or claim 
for a set off. For this reason, the trial court's granting of summary judgment should not 
be affirmed, but instead should be reversed and this matter remanded for trial on this 
issue. 
The undersigned counsel certifies that the foregoing petition is made in good faith 
and not for delay. 
Respectfully submitted this 12th day of November, 1998. 
^^Y~^J <Jyy%&Z-^ 
Brran W. Steffensen \) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ( c day of I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be p( mailed, postage prepaid; and/or 
hand-delivered by fax and/or by courier; addressed to: 
John P Harrington 
Sean B D Hosman 
Ray Quinney & Nebeker 
79 South Main #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
7 
